A Structural Analysis of Governing Popular Sentiment in Zhenguan Zhengyao
1. Question
Why can the people’s support not be gained by coercive methods, and why must governance be based on the ruler’s virtue?
2. Abstract
In Zhenguan Zhengyao, Emperor Taizong discusses the governance of the people with his senior ministers. In these discussions, it is argued that governing the people through punishment and intimidation cannot last for long, and that the people are more likely to submit willingly when governance is grounded in the ruler’s virtue and moderation in policy.
This study structurally analyzes the discussions between Taizong and his ministers on the governance of the people in Zhenguan Zhengyao. It clarifies why popular support cannot be maintained in a lasting way through punishment or intimidation, and why it becomes stable only through the ruler’s virtue and moderate policies. It then abstracts this structure in a form applicable to modern organizations.
3. Method
This study extracts, as Layer 1 facts, passages in Zhenguan Zhengyao in which Taizong and his ministers discuss the maintenance of the people’s support.
It then reconstructs, in Layer 2, the difference between trying to maintain the people’s support through punishment and intimidation, and trying to maintain it through rule by virtue. Finally, in Layer 3, it derives insights that remain applicable to modern organizations.
4. Layer 1: Fact
1) Coercive rule cannot preserve order and social customs for long
In Chapter 3 of the Political Order section of Zhenguan Zhengyao, Taizong asks why the governance of recent rulers and ministers is inferior to that of ancient times. Wang Gui answers that ancient rulers valued calmness and shared the same wish as the people, namely to live in peace. By contrast, more recent rulers only caused suffering to the people in order to satisfy their own desires, and the ministers they appointed were not men of cultivated learning. As a result, moral practice disappeared, and the warm and good customs of society were destroyed.
What is shown here is the recognition that ruling the people through intimidation and exploitation is inferior to governance based on order and social custom, and Taizong accepts this view.
The problem here is that a form of rule that hurts the people in order to satisfy the ruler’s desires destroys order and social custom themselves.
2) Taizong saw governance through benevolence, righteousness, sincerity, and trustworthiness as the principle of long-term stability
In Chapter 1 of the On Benevolence and Righteousness section, Taizong says that when he observes the emperors of the past, those who governed through benevolence and righteousness arising from a loving heart enjoyed a long national fortune. By contrast, those who relied on harsh laws and state power to control the people may have been able to solve the abuses of a disordered age for a short time, but their states also quickly fell.
What is clearly stated here is that rule by force may have a short-term effect, but it does not lead to long-term stability. Taizong further shows that he himself intends to govern the state through benevolence, righteousness, sincerity, and trustworthiness.
3) The ruler’s virtue and moderation in policy produce the people’s trust and willing submission
In Chapter 1 of the Ruler and Minister section, Taizong says that the way of the ruler is first to pity the people and grant them benevolence. This is a clear statement that the ruler must first correct himself and place the people first.
In Chapter 4 of the On Luxury and Excess section, Ma Zhou says in his memorial that wise rulers of the past practiced frugality toward themselves and bestowed benefits on the people. As a result, the people loved their ruler like a father or mother, admired him like the sun and moon, revered him like a god, and feared him like thunder.
What is shown here is that the people did not merely obey because they were intimidated. They submitted because they developed trust and respect toward the ruler’s character and toward moderate policies.
5. Layer 2: Order
5-1. Coercive rule can make people obey, but it cannot make them accept
Based on these facts, coercive rule can be structurally described as follows:
Coercion
↓
Obedience (outwardly)
↓
Dissatisfaction (inwardly)
↓
Accumulation
↓
Resistance / alienation
Force and punishment can produce outward obedience. However, this is nothing more than obedience produced by coercion; it does not create inner acceptance or trust within the people. Therefore, dissatisfaction accumulates where it cannot immediately be seen, and once it passes a critical point, it erupts as alienation or rebellion.
5-2. Virtue and moderate policy create a condition in which people want to follow
By contrast, the structure of rule by virtue can be organized as follows:
Virtue (character)
+
Moderation (policy)
↓
The people’s trust
↓
Formation of order among the people (they uphold order themselves)
↓
Voluntary obedience
Here, virtue means the ruler’s personal foundation: restraining desire and placing the people first.
Moderation means a governing attitude that does not exhaust the people unnecessarily and keeps the burden of policy within proper limits.
When these two are combined, the people develop trust in the ruler. At the same time, even without being forced, they move in the direction of maintaining order by themselves and come to follow willingly. In other words, virtue and policy moderation do not simply “make people obey”; they create a condition in which people want to obey.
5-3. Coercive rule raises maintenance costs, while rule by virtue lowers them
If this structural difference is reorganized from the perspective of maintenance cost, coercive rule becomes the following:
Coercion (intimidation, force, legal control)
↓
Decline of popular support (inward dissatisfaction, outward obedience)
↓
Accumulation of dissatisfaction
↓
Sabotage
↓
Further regulation and coercion
↓
Rising maintenance cost
↓
Breakdown
Under coercive rule, dissatisfaction among the people increases, so additional monitoring, regulation, and punishment become necessary to suppress it. In other words, the cost of governance rises step by step, and eventually the system becomes unsustainable.
By contrast, rule by virtue becomes the following:
Rule by virtue (character + moderate policy)
↓
Trust
↓
Formation of order (higher maturity among the people)
↓
Voluntary obedience
↓
Low maintenance cost
↓
Stability
Under rule by virtue, the people form order voluntarily on the basis of trust, so large-scale coercive control is not needed. As a result, maintenance costs remain low, and the system tends toward long-term stability.
5-4. The basis of popular support lies in maturity and trust
Taken together, the model for restoring and maintaining the people’s support can be expressed as follows:
Popular Support = Maturity (M) × Trust (T)
Maturity: the people’s inner order, including morality, restraint, and the capacity to form order.
Trust: the degree of trust the people place in the ruler or governing body.
What is important here is that trust cannot easily be formed in a short period of time. It requires long-term cultivation. However, once trust is established, the cost of maintaining the people’s support can be kept low, and the OS can remain stable over the long term.
6. Layer 3: Insight
A structural reading of the governance of popular support in Zhenguan Zhengyao shows that rule by coercive force can produce outward obedience, but it cannot produce inward acceptance. As a result, dissatisfaction accumulates internally and eventually erupts in the form of revolt, alienation, or sabotage.
In other words, coercive rule has a structure that gradually raises the cost of governance and ultimately moves toward breakdown. It may be suitable for short-term suppression, but it is not suited for long-term maintenance.
By contrast, under rule by virtue, the people form order voluntarily on the basis of trust and obey willingly. As a result, maintenance costs remain low, and governance becomes more stable over the long term.
What follows from this is that the essence of governing popular support does not lie in how strongly one can suppress people. It lies in how much trust one can build, and in whether one can create a condition in which the people form order by themselves.
Therefore, the ruler’s virtue is necessary not because it is merely a personal moral beauty.
Virtue is necessary because it is a governance technology that gains the people’s trust, lowers the maintenance cost of governance, and makes long-term stability possible.
7. Implications for the Present
The same applies to modern organizations. From the viewpoint of governance cost, control based on trust is more desirable than coercive control. Even so, many modern organizations tend to rely on coercive methods because terms of office and evaluation periods are short, and results are demanded within a limited time.
For this reason, leaders often prioritize short-term order and try to make people comply through forceful means. However, if such methods continue for long, dissatisfaction accumulates among members, trust inside the organization declines, and the organization as a whole becomes unstable.
Therefore, what is required in modern society is not governance aimed mainly at short-term results within a limited term, but organizational management aimed at gaining popular support and trust from a long-term perspective.
The stability of modern organizations depends on whether they can shift from short-term obedience to long-term trust.
8. Conclusion
Popular support can be temporarily suppressed by force or law, but it cannot be maintained in a lasting way.
The ruler’s virtue raises the people’s capacity to form order, that is, their maturity, while moderate policy adjusts the burden placed on the people and thereby creates acceptance and trust.
As a result, voluntary obedience becomes possible, and only then can governance become stable over the long term.
Therefore, coercive methods cannot gain popular support, while the ruler’s virtue can, because coercion can impose obedience but cannot create trust, whereas virtue creates trust and gives rise to a condition in which the people voluntarily form order. For this reason, the basis of long-term stability lies not in coercion, but in virtue.
9. Source Texts
Harada Tanenari, Shinshaku Kanbun Taikei: Zhenguan Zhengyao (Vol. 1), Meiji Shoin, 1978.
Harada Tanenari, Shinshaku Kanbun Taikei: Zhenguan Zhengyao (Vol. 2), Meiji Shoin, 1978.