A Three-Layer Analysis (TLA) of Livy, History of Rome, Book 3
1. Research Question
Why does disorder in domestic order invite underestimation and invasion by external enemies?
This question examines why Rome’s internal confusion became connected to the attack decisions of external enemies in Livy’s History of Rome from its Foundation, Book 3.
At first glance, disorder in domestic order looks like an internal problem.
Patricians and plebeians oppose each other.
Tribunes and consular command clash.
Laws, accusations, trials, and assemblies become confused.
Military recruitment becomes involved in political conflict.
These look like institutional problems inside Rome.
However, external enemies do not see domestic disorder only as an internal problem.
They see whether Rome can produce an integrated response to external threats.
Can the Senate make a decision?
Can the consuls recruit soldiers?
Will the tribunes cooperate with military mobilization?
Will the plebeians accept military service?
Do soldiers trust their commanders?
Can Rome rescue its allies?
Can Rome move as one decision-making body against external enemies?
When these functions look broken, external enemies underestimate the state.
This article analyzes disorder in domestic order as an external signal that invites underestimation and invasion by enemies.
2. Abstract
Disorder in domestic order invites underestimation and invasion by external enemies because domestic confusion sends a signal to external enemies: “This state cannot produce an integrated response.”
External enemies do not judge the domestic problems of another state in moral terms.
They observe the operating condition of that state.
Can the Senate judge?
Can the consuls recruit?
Will the tribunes cooperate with military mobilization?
Will the plebeians accept military service?
Do soldiers trust their commanders?
Can the state rescue its allies?
Can it move as one decision-making body against external enemies?
When these functions look broken, external enemies underestimate that state.
In Livy’s Book 3, conflict between patricians and plebeians, conflict between tribunes and consular command, delay in military recruitment, confusion in assemblies, decline of soldier trust T, and instability in allied defense appear again and again.
From the viewpoint of external enemies, this is not only domestic politics.
It is a condition in which the defense function of the Roman OS is delayed and Rome cannot produce an integrated response.
The conclusion of this article is as follows.
Disorder in domestic order invites underestimation and invasion by external enemies because internal conflict damages recruitment, command, morale, the alliance API, and crisis judgment inside the state OS. External enemies observe disorder in domestic order as a sign that “this state cannot focus on external threats,” “its counterattack will be delayed,” and “its allied rescue will also be slow.” Therefore, domestic disorder becomes an external signal of attack possibility.
3. Research Method
This article uses Three-Layer Analysis.
Three-Layer Analysis divides historical material into three layers.
Layer 1 is Fact.
This layer organizes the events recorded by Livy: treaty violation, raids, and siege by the Aequi; the Volsci moving toward Antium; the Aequi attacking Tusculum; the Sabine invasion; conflict between tribunes and the Senate; political conflict around military recruitment; distrust in government under the decemvirate; decline of legion morale; withdrawal to the Sacred Mount; information about external enemies sent by allied envoys; confusion in assemblies; the speech of Quinctius; agreement between the Senate and the tribunes; and Roman victory.
Layer 2 is Order.
This layer analyzes how disorder in domestic order produces delay in military recruitment, decline in legitimacy of command, decline of soldier trust T, inward enemy recognition, instability in the alliance API, and low-cost attacks by external enemies.
Layer 3 is Insight.
This layer draws the insight that domestic order is not only a problem of internal government. It is also a form of deterrence against external enemies.
This article also uses OS Organizational Design Theory, R1.34.00.00.
Five concepts are especially important.
The first is domestic order. Domestic order does not simply mean that the city is quiet. It means that the Senate, consuls, tribunes, plebeians, citizens, legions, and alliance API can connect to external defense when necessary.
The second is legitimacy of command. Even if command authority exists in formal terms, military mobilization does not operate well unless soldiers receive the command as legitimate.
The third is soldier trust T. Soldiers are the execution environment of the state OS. If soldier trust T declines, the legions exist, but they do not fully operate as fighting power.
The fourth is the alliance API. Rome’s defensive power depends on trust with allies and the ability to rescue them.
The fifth is domestic order as deterrence. A state has deterrence when external enemies believe that if they attack, they will receive a quick counterattack. Domestic order is the foundation of that condition.
4. Layer 1: Fact
In Livy’s Book 3, disorder in domestic order repeatedly invites underestimation and invasion by external enemies.
In sections 2 to 4, the Aequi violate peace, raid, and besiege Roman forces. External enemies strike gaps around Rome and use raids, surprise attacks, and siege.
In sections 19 to 21, Cincinnatus rebukes both the tribunes and the Senate, and the conflict over military action and the proposal of a law is adjusted. This shows that disorder in domestic order was directly connected to military mobilization.
In sections 22 to 23, the Volsci move toward Antium, and the Aequi attack Tusculum. External enemies shake Rome’s alliance API and defensive range.
In sections 25 to 26, the Aequi rise again, the Sabines invade, and a dictator is appointed. External enemies launch new attacks when Rome’s processing load becomes heavy.
In section 30, the tribunes demand an increase in their number as a condition for cooperating with military recruitment, and the Senate accepts it. Military mobilization is connected to domestic order and the plebeian representative circuit.
In sections 32 to 33, power is transferred to the decemvirs, and appeal no longer reaches their decisions. The suspension of the liberty-protection circuit begins to lower internal trust.
In section 38, the decemvirs remain in power after their term, and external enemies take advantage of the confusion. An abnormal domestic order induces enemy attack decisions.
In section 42, the legions under the decemvirs lose fighting spirit. Distrust in government appears as a decline in military power.
In sections 50 to 52, the army and the plebeians withdraw to the Sacred Mount. The execution environment stops participating in the governing OS, and defensive power declines.
In section 60, Latin and Hernican envoys come to Rome and report the war preparations of the Aequi and the Volsci. The movement of external enemies is transmitted through the alliance network.
In section 66, accusations against patricians and confusion in assemblies continue, and external enemies see Rome’s internal conflict as an opportunity. Disorder in domestic order is connected to underestimation and invasion by external enemies.
In section 68, Quinctius argues that the power of the plebeians should be directed not toward the Forum, but toward the external enemy. This speech relocates enemy recognition from internal opponents to external enemies.
In section 69, the Senate and the tribunes agree in an emergency and order citizens of military age to gather at once. Domestic circuits are reconnected to external defense.
In section 70, Rome wins through unified command and coordinated attack. When domestic order recovers, underestimation by external enemies fails.
In sections 71 to 72, Roman citizens make a dishonorable decision in a territorial dispute between allied communities. This shows that the decline of domestic judgment also affects trust in the alliance API.
This sequence shows that disorder in domestic order is not only a domestic problem.
In section 38, external enemies take advantage of the internal abnormality of the decemvirs remaining in power. In section 42, distrust in government appears as a decline in legion morale. In section 66, confusion in assemblies and repeated accusations are observed by external enemies as an opportunity for attack. In sections 69 to 70, when the Senate and the tribunes agree and military mobilization succeeds, enemy underestimation collapses.
Therefore, disorder in domestic order sent a signal to external enemies: “If you attack now, Rome will be slow.”
5. Layer 2: Order
Domestic order is not only a problem of internal government.
It is also deterrence against external enemies.
For a state not to be underestimated by enemies, military power alone is not enough. Domestic order is also necessary.
The reason is that what external enemies truly fear is not only the number of soldiers.
They fear a state that makes decisions quickly, recruits legitimately, has soldiers who trust command, processes internal conflict inside institutions, and can rescue its allies.
On the other hand, even if a state has a large population and many weapons, external enemies will underestimate it if domestic order is broken.
The Senate may judge, but the tribunes may resist.
The consuls may recruit, but the plebeians may not respond.
Soldiers may go out, but they may have no fighting spirit.
Allies may ask for help, but domestic conflict may delay the response.
Enemies may approach, while accusations and political conflict continue inside the city.
From the viewpoint of external enemies, such a state may be large, but it is slow.
In other words, disorder in domestic order gives external enemies information that says, “This is a time when we can attack.”
Therefore, domestic order is part of deterrence against external enemies.
5.1 Disorder in Domestic Order Appears as Delay in Military Recruitment
The first structure is that disorder in domestic order appears to external enemies as delay in military recruitment.
For a state to respond to external enemies, it must first move its army.
Information must arrive.
The Senate must make a decision.
The consuls must recruit soldiers.
The tribunes must not block mobilization.
Citizens must gather.
Legions must be formed.
Commanders must depart.
If this circuit operates quickly, external enemies cannot easily underestimate that state.
However, when domestic order is broken, this circuit becomes clogged.
The tribunes may refuse recruitment.
The plebeians may distrust command authority.
The Senate may be consumed by internal conflict.
Consular command may be seen as close to royal power.
Assemblies may be confused by laws and accusations.
From the viewpoint of external enemies, this is a military opening.
The question is not whether Rome has an army.
The question is whether Rome can send its army quickly when necessary.
When domestic order is broken, the army exists, but it does not move.
That is why external enemies underestimate and invade.
5.2 Disorder in Domestic Order Lowers the Legitimacy of Command
The second structure is that disorder in domestic order lowers the legitimacy of command.
Military mobilization requires command authority.
However, command authority is not enough if it exists only in formal terms.
Soldiers must receive that command as legitimate.
Under the decemvirate, command authority existed in formal terms.
However, when appeal was suspended, tribunes were absent, the decemvirs remained in power after their term, and justice was connected to private desire, soldiers could no longer trust command authority.
In this condition, commands reach the soldiers.
But the will of the soldiers does not move.
External enemies underestimate this condition.
The reason is that a state whose command authority has lost legitimacy may send soldiers, but their fighting spirit is low.
As section 42 of Livy’s Book 3 shows, the legions under the decemvirs lost fighting spirit.
This was not a problem of military technique.
The legitimacy of command had collapsed because domestic order had broken down.
5.3 Disorder in Domestic Order Lowers Soldier Trust T
The third structure is that disorder in domestic order lowers soldier trust T.
In OS Organizational Design Theory, trust T means the degree to which the governed side receives the judgment, institutions, rewards and punishments, policy, and rule of the OS as valid.
Soldiers are the execution environment of the state OS.
If soldier trust T is high, soldiers accept state commands and accept danger.
If soldier trust T declines, soldiers may go to war, but they do not fight seriously.
When domestic order is broken, soldier trust T declines.
Public officials cannot be trusted.
Trials cannot be trusted.
Appeal is not possible.
The representative circuit does not function.
Victory is used to maintain the authority of rulers.
The voice of the field does not reach the center.
In this condition, soldiers lose the reason to execute the state’s defense application.
External enemies observe this decline of T.
Even if the number of soldiers is large, military power becomes weak if trust T is low.
Therefore, disorder in domestic order encourages external enemies to invade.
5.4 Disorder in Domestic Order Turns Enemy Recognition Inward
The fourth structure is that disorder in domestic order turns enemy recognition inward.
A state that is strong against external enemies can recognize external enemies as external enemies.
However, when domestic order is broken, enemy recognition turns inward.
Plebeians see patricians as enemies.
Patricians see tribunes as blockers.
Tribunes are cautious about consular command.
Assemblies are confused by accusations and replies.
Soldiers distrust internal commanders more than external enemies.
In this condition, even if external enemies appear, the whole state cannot focus on them.
External enemies read this division of enemy recognition as an attack opportunity.
The reason is that the most difficult enemy for them is an internally unified Rome.
On the other hand, Rome that sees internal opponents as enemies is slow against external enemies.
Therefore, disorder in domestic order becomes a cause of underestimation by external enemies.
5.5 Disorder in Domestic Order Shakes Trust in the Alliance API
The fifth structure is that disorder in domestic order shakes trust in the alliance API.
Rome’s defensive power did not stand only on the city of Rome itself.
It was connected to an alliance network with the Latins, the Hernici, Tusculum, and others.
For this alliance API to function, Rome had to be trusted.
Can Rome send help?
Will Rome keep agreements?
Will Rome abandon its allies?
Can Rome overcome internal conflict and respond to external enemies?
When domestic order is broken, allies become anxious.
External enemies use this anxiety.
They attack allied communities.
They aim at delays in Roman rescue.
They show surrounding cities Rome’s weakness.
They shake Roman leadership.
Therefore, disorder in domestic order affects not only external enemies, but also the alliance API.
For external enemies, this becomes an opportunity for invasion.
5.6 Disorder in Domestic Order Allows Low-Cost Attacks by External Enemies
The sixth structure is that disorder in domestic order allows external enemies to use low-cost attacks.
External enemies do not always want a decisive battle.
When Rome is delayed by internal conflict, they choose raids, surprise attacks, scattered attacks, and pressure against allied cities.
This is rational.
If Rome cannot counterattack quickly, external enemies can gain large effects with little risk.
They can damage fields.
They can spread fear among citizens.
They can threaten allies.
They can expand confusion inside Rome.
They can worsen the conflict between patricians and plebeians.
Even if they cannot win in a direct battle, they can place a heavy load on the Roman OS.
Therefore, disorder in domestic order opens a cheap attack route for external enemies.
5.7 Disorder in Domestic Order Consumes the Processing Capacity of the State OS
The seventh structure is that disorder in domestic order consumes the processing capacity of the state OS.
A state OS has many tasks to process.
External defense.
Military recruitment.
Rescue of allies.
Law proposals.
Trials.
Coordination with tribunes.
Judgment by the Senate.
Handling civic anxiety.
Response to religious warnings.
When domestic order is broken, the processing capacity of the state OS is consumed by internal conflict.
People fight in trials.
People fight over laws.
People fight over recruitment.
People fight through accusations.
Tribunes and consuls oppose each other.
The Senate must process division.
As a result, recognition A, information architecture IA, judgment, human resources, and time available for external defense decline.
External enemies use this decline in processing capacity as a reason for underestimation.
In other words, disorder in domestic order is an overloaded state of the state OS.
External enemies strike that overloaded condition.
6. Layer 3: Insight
Disorder in domestic order invites underestimation and invasion by external enemies because it is observed from outside as a decline in the defense capacity of the state OS.
Disorder in domestic order does not simply mean that the city is noisy.
It appears as delay in military recruitment, decline in legitimacy of command, decline of soldier trust T, division of enemy recognition, instability in the alliance API, and delay in senatorial judgment.
External enemies observe these signs.
They judge that Rome cannot respond to external enemies as one OS.
Therefore, they underestimate Rome.
Then they invade.
However, this underestimation succeeds only if Rome cannot reintegrate. If Rome can reintegrate, the underestimation fails.
In sections 69 to 70, the Senate and the tribunes agree in an emergency, citizens of military age gather, command is unified, and the Roman army wins.
In other words, what breaks the underestimation of external enemies is not military technique alone.
It is the reconnection of domestic order.
6.1 Domestic Disorder and External Invasion Model
The structure in which disorder in domestic order invites external invasion can be modeled as follows.
External invasion induction
= disorder in domestic order
× delay in recruitment
× decline of legitimacy of command
× decline of soldier trust T
× division of enemy recognition
× instability of alliance API
× rise in expected value of enemy attack
The core of this model is the rise in expected value of enemy attack.
External enemies see disorder in domestic order and judge that the probability of attack success has risen and the cost of counterattack has fallen.
As a result, they invade.
6.2 Domestic Order Model
Domestic order can be organized as follows.
Domestic order
= judgment by the Senate
× consular command
× tribune representative circuit
× plebeian trust T
× soldier trust T
× trial and appeal circuit
× alliance API
Domestic order does not simply mean that the city is quiet.
It means that each institution can perform its role and connect to external defense when necessary.
6.3 External Enemy Underestimation Model
Underestimation by external enemies occurs as follows.
External enemy underestimation
= visible internal conflict
× delay in defensive response
× estimate of inability to recruit an army
× estimate of decline in soldier trust T
× estimate of command confusion
× estimate of delay in allied rescue
The important point is that external enemies do not need to know all internal information inside Rome.
They only need to observe visible delay, confusion, inability to recruit, and delay in allied rescue.
That alone is enough for them to judge that Rome can be underestimated.
6.4 Internal and External Crisis Linkage Model
Disorder in domestic order and external invasion are linked as follows.
Internal and external crisis linkage
= internal conflict
× underestimation by external enemies
× invasion
× civic anxiety
× further worsening of internal conflict
This cycle is dangerous.
Internal conflict invites external enemies.
External enemies increase civic anxiety.
Civic anxiety worsens internal conflict.
Internal conflict further delays recruitment.
To break this negative cycle, internal conflict must be temporarily reconnected to external defense.
The speech of Quinctius and the agreement between the Senate and the tribunes were this reconnection.
6.5 Domestic Order as Deterrence Model
Domestic order is also deterrence against external enemies.
Domestic order as deterrence
= quick recruitment
× legitimacy of command
× soldier trust T
× cooperation between Senate and tribunes
× trust in the alliance API
× integrated response to external enemies
In this model, deterrence is not military technique alone.
Deterrence means that external enemies believe, “If we attack, we will receive a quick counterattack.”
For this condition to exist, domestic order is necessary.
6.6 Operating Model
The operating model of this case can be organized into six stages.
The first stage is disorder in domestic order.
Disorder in domestic order
= conflict between patricians and plebeians
× resistance by tribunes
× distrust of consular command
× confusion in assemblies
× chain of accusations
× delay in military recruitment
At this stage, the Roman OS loses resources to internal processing.
The second stage is underestimation by external enemies.
Underestimation by external enemies
= observation of Roman internal conflict
× estimate of delay in military recruitment
× estimate of decline in soldier trust T
× estimate of command confusion
× estimate of delay in allied rescue
External enemies judge that Rome cannot move as one OS.
The third stage is invasion and raiding.
Invasion and raiding
= low-cost attack
× damage to fields
× pressure on allied areas
× approach to walls
× spread of fear
× amplification of Roman internal confusion
Here, external enemies do not only seek direct battle. They attack the load capacity of the Roman OS.
The fourth stage is the amplification of internal and external crisis.
Crisis amplification
= damage by external enemies
× civic fear
× pressure on senatorial judgment
× pressure on tribune judgment
× urgency of recruitment
× risk of renewed internal conflict
At this stage, Rome is forced to choose whether to continue internal conflict or reconnect to external defense.
The fifth stage is the reconnection of internal circuits.
Reconnection of internal circuits
= shared crisis recognition
× externalization of enemy recognition
× judgment by the Senate
× consent of the tribunes
× citizen mobilization
× unified command
If this reconnection succeeds, underestimation by external enemies becomes a miscalculation.
The sixth stage is the failure of enemy underestimation.
Failure of enemy underestimation
= successful recruitment
× unified command
× recovery of soldier trust T
× focus on external enemies
× victory in battle
× recovery of trust in the alliance API
At this stage, domestic order again functions as deterrence against external enemies.
6.7 Causal Chain
The causal chain of this case can be organized as follows.
Conflict between patricians and plebeians
→ clash between tribunes and consular command
→ confusion over laws accusations trials and assemblies
→ delay in military recruitment
→ decline of legitimacy of command
→ decline of soldier trust T
→ instability of the alliance API
→ external enemies observe disorder in Rome’s domestic order
→ they judge that Rome cannot focus on external enemies
→ external enemies underestimate Rome
→ raids invasion and pressure on allied areas
→ increase in civic anxiety
→ internal and external crisis become linked
→ Quinctius expresses the crisis
→ enemy recognition is moved from inside to outside
→ the Senate and the tribunes agree
→ citizens of military age gather at once
→ command is unified
→ Roman victory
→ underestimation by external enemies fails
This causal chain shows that underestimation and invasion by external enemies were not accidental.
External enemies observed delay in the Roman OS.
When domestic order broke down, external enemies read it as attack possibility.
6.8 Final Insight
The final insight is as follows.
Disorder in domestic order invites underestimation and invasion by external enemies because it is observed from outside as a decline in the defense capacity of the state OS.
Disorder in domestic order does not simply mean that the city is noisy.
It appears as delay in military recruitment, decline in legitimacy of command, decline of soldier trust T, division of enemy recognition, instability in the alliance API, and delay in senatorial judgment.
External enemies see this and judge that Rome cannot respond to external enemies as one OS.
Therefore, they underestimate Rome.
Then they invade.
However, this underestimation succeeds only if Rome cannot reintegrate. If Rome can reintegrate, it fails.
In sections 69 to 70, the Senate and the tribunes agree in an emergency, citizens of military age gather, command is unified, and the Roman army wins.
This means that what breaks the underestimation of external enemies is not military technique alone.
It is the reconnection of domestic order.
7. Implications for the Present
This case is also important for modern organizations.
In companies, states, and other organizations, disorder in internal order leads to underestimation from the outside.
Management is divided.
The field does not cooperate.
Labor and management are in strong conflict.
Decision-making is slow.
Customer response is delayed.
Quality problems are left unresolved.
Talent keeps leaving.
Public communication becomes confused.
Competitors and external stakeholders observe these signs.
Then they judge, “Now we can take something,” “Now we can attack,” or “This organization will be slow to respond.”
Therefore, domestic order is not merely internal management.
It is deterrence against external pressure.
7.1 Disorder in Internal Order Is Visible from the Outside
Inside an organization, people often think that conflict is only an internal problem.
However, the outside sees its effects.
Decision-making is slow.
Public messages are inconsistent.
Customer response is delayed.
Quality problem response is slow.
Responsible people change often.
Field morale is low.
Talent is leaving.
These are indicators that disorder in internal order has appeared outside.
External competitors do not need to know the details of internal debate.
It is enough for them to observe visible delay, confusion, low morale, and customer anxiety.
7.2 Deterrence Is Not Only Military Power or Technology
For a state, deterrence is not only the number of weapons or soldiers.
For a company, competitiveness is not only technology or money.
What is necessary is an operating condition that makes external actors think, “This opponent will respond quickly.”
Decision-making is fast.
The field moves.
Representative circuits and the upper layer can cooperate in an emergency.
Customer response is quick.
Trust exists with allies and business partners.
Correction after failure is fast.
This condition is difficult to attack from the outside.
On the other hand, an organization with disorder in internal order is underestimated even if it has ability.
7.3 Internal Conflict Itself Is Not the Problem
The important point is that internal conflict itself is not always bad.
In Rome, the conflict between patricians and plebeians was also a correction circuit of the republican OS.
The resistance of the tribunes was necessary to protect plebeian liberty.
In modern organizations, audit, labor unions, compliance, whistleblowing, and objections from the field are also important.
The problem is not internal conflict itself.
The problem is that external response stops because of internal conflict.
The problem is that internal circuits cannot reconnect to external response in an emergency.
7.4 In an Emergency, Internal Circuits Must Be Reconnected to External Response
In an emergency, internal circuits must be reconnected to external response.
It is not necessary to erase all conflicts.
However, the organization must be able to produce an integrated response to external crisis.
In Rome, the speech of Quinctius relocated enemy recognition from internal opponents to external enemies.
After that, the Senate and the tribunes agreed, citizens of military age gathered, and command was unified.
Through this, underestimation by external enemies failed.
Modern organizations are the same.
Even while internal differences remain, external crisis requires integration of decision-making, field mobilization, customer response, public communication, and quality response.
7.5 Preserved Proposition for Modern Organizations
The preserved proposition for modern organizations is as follows.
Disorder in domestic or internal order is a signal that tells external enemies or competitors that attack is possible. Internal conflict itself is not the problem. The problem is that recruitment, decision-making, morale, alliance or customer trust, and external response stop because of internal conflict. An organization that is not underestimated by external actors is one that can reconnect internal circuits to external response in an emergency and produce integrated action, even while internal conflict still exists.
8. Conclusion
Disorder in domestic order invites underestimation and invasion by external enemies because domestic confusion is observed from outside as a decline in the defense capacity of the state OS.
External enemies do not judge the domestic affairs of another state in moral terms.
They observe the operating condition.
Can the Senate judge?
Can the consuls recruit?
Will the tribunes cooperate?
Will the plebeians accept military service?
Do soldiers trust commands?
Can the state rescue allies?
Can it move as one decision-making body against external enemies?
When these functions are broken, external enemies underestimate that state.
In Livy’s Book 3, conflict between patricians and plebeians, clash between tribunes and consular command, delay in recruitment, confusion in assemblies, decline of soldier trust T, and instability of the alliance API appear repeatedly.
This condition means that the Roman OS cannot activate its defense function immediately.
That is why external enemies invade.
However, underestimation by external enemies is not absolute.
If Rome reconnects its internal circuits to external defense, enemy underestimation collapses.
In sections 69 to 70, the Senate and the tribunes agree, citizens of military age gather, and command is unified.
As a result, the Roman army wins.
The conclusion of this article can be summarized in one sentence.
Disorder in domestic order invites underestimation and invasion by external enemies because internal conflict damages recruitment, command, morale, the alliance API, and crisis judgment inside the state OS. External enemies observe domestic disorder as a sign that “this state cannot focus on external threats,” “its counterattack will be delayed,” and “its allied rescue will also be slow.” What breaks the underestimation of external enemies is not military technique alone, but the ability to reconnect domestic order to external defense.
9. Sources
Livy, History of Rome from its Foundation, Book 3.
Japanese translation used as base text: Titus Livius, History of Rome from its Foundation 2, translated by Satoshi Iwatani, Kyoto University Press, 2008.
OS Organizational Design Theory, R1.34.00.00.