A Three-Layer Analysis (TLA) of Livy, History of Rome, Book 1
1. Question
Why can a house network become both a foundation supporting the state and a route for privatizing the state?
2. Abstract
A house network can become both a foundation supporting the state and a route for privatizing the state because a house is a semi-institutional unit connected to the core of the state OS through bloodline, marriage, obligation, property, succession, and personnel appointment.
In an ancient state, the state does not operate only through abstract institutions. To operate the state, human resources, military force, property, support bases, information routes, legitimacy, and succession candidates are necessary. Royal houses, clans, and noble houses are important units that supply these resources.
In this sense, a house network supports the state. Through houses, the king and the state OS obtain people, troops, property, alliances through marriage, succession candidates, legitimacy of kingship, and new members connected to the community.
However, the same structure can also become a route for privatizing the state.
This is because a house network is not connected to the state OS only through public purpose. A house has its own purposes: the honor of the house, property, succession, marriage relations, promotion of relatives, jealousy toward rival houses, old grudges, and transfer of power to descendants.
As long as these purposes are aligned with the purpose of the state OS, the house network supports the state. However, when the purpose of the house begins to override the purpose of the state, the house network becomes a route for privatizing the state.
3. Method
This study follows the structure of Three-Layer Analysis, or TLA.
In Layer 1, this study organizes the facts of Servius’s popular approval, the ambition of Tarquinius to seize kingship, his approach to the nobles, Tullia’s encouragement, and the path toward the seizure of kingship.
In Layer 2, these facts are connected to structures such as the network of royal houses, clans, and noble houses, OS decision-maker, judgment against the OS purpose, Family API, Marriage API, and A, IA, H, and V.
In Layer 3, this study explains why a house network can become both a foundation supporting the state and a route for privatizing the state.
4. Layer 1: Fact
In Livy, History of Rome, Book 1, the crisis of the late monarchy proceeds through the royal house, the nobles, marriage relations, and house networks.
In Chapter 46, even after Servius becomes king with popular approval, the desire of Tarquinius to seize kingship does not weaken. He sees that Servius’s distribution of land to the plebs was done against the will of the nobles. He thinks this gives him an opportunity to criticize Servius among the nobles and to increase his influence in the senate. In his house, there is Tullia, his wife, who encourages his ambition.
Here, the house network works in two directions.
On the one hand, by gaining support from nobles and houses, Tarquinius obtains a political base. This is the side where the house network supports the formation of kingship.
On the other hand, the same network weakens the public legitimacy and popular approval of Servius and becomes a route for seizing kingship. This is the side where the house network privatizes the state OS.
In Chapter 47, Tullia presses her husband Tarquinius not to make the murders of husband and wife meaningless. She urges him not only to desire the throne, but to seize it. She brings up the household gods, ancestral guardians, the image of his father, the royal house, the throne, and the name of Tarquinius. She pushes her husband toward the seizure of kingship.
In this scene, the house network uses the language of legitimacy to justify the seizure of kingship. Household gods, ancestors, the royal house, the royal name, and the throne should originally support order and succession. However, when they are connected to private ambition, they become a logic that distorts the decision criteria V of the state OS.
The question is no longer, “Is this right for the state?”
The decision criterion becomes, “Is this natural for the house of Tarquinius?”
At this point, the house network turns from a foundation supporting the state into a route for privatizing the state.
5. Layer 2: Order
In Layer 2, a house network can be understood as a semi-institutional unit connected to the state OS.
The network of royal houses, clans, and noble houses is a structure that reproduces ruling coalitions through bloodline, obligation, and marriage. In an ancient state, royal houses, clans, and noble houses are not merely kinship groups. They are semi-institutional units that influence the core of the state.
Therefore, a house network is necessary for state formation.
A house supplies human resources.
A house supplies military force.
A house supplies property.
A house supplies information routes.
A house supplies alliances through marriage.
A house reinforces the legitimacy of kingship.
A house supplies succession candidates.
When bureaucracy and institutional division are still immature, a house network becomes an important infrastructure of the state OS.
However, this same structure can also become a route for privatizing the state.
A house has its own purposes. These include the honor of the house, property, succession, marriage relations, promotion of relatives, jealousy toward rival houses, old grudges, and transfer of power to descendants. As long as these purposes are aligned with the state purpose, the house network supports the state. But when the house purpose overrides the state purpose, the state OS becomes subordinate to the interest of the house.
This structure can be organized through A, IA, H, and V.
For A, a house network can support recognition.
A house has information about regions, troops, property, human relations, and external forces. The king and the state OS can understand reality through houses. However, when house interests become too strong, A is distorted. Reality is interpreted through questions such as: “Is this favorable to our house?”, “Is this unfavorable to a rival house?”, and “Which person inside the royal house should we support?”
For IA, a house network can create information routes.
A house can connect the royal house, clans, powerful people, local regions, and military groups. However, when house interests become too strong, IA becomes factionalized. Only convenient information rises, and inconvenient information is blocked. Advice and opposition are treated not as correction for the state, but as attacks by a rival house.
For H, a house network can become a source of human resources.
A house supplies generals, advisers, priests, diplomats, succession candidates, and assistants for rule. However, when the house network is privatized, H declines. Personnel appointments, rewards, punishments, promotion, and demotion are decided not by capability, but by which house a person belongs to, whose relative by marriage the person is, whose child the person is, or to whom the person owes obligation.
For V, a house network can reinforce legitimacy.
Bloodline, marriage, ancestors, house name, and tradition can become decision criteria that support kingship and state order. However, when house purpose overrides state purpose, V declines. The criterion is no longer “Is this right for the state?” It becomes “Does this protect the honor of the house?”, “Does this increase the power of our house?”, or “Does this exclude a rival house?”
In this way, a house network can support A, IA, H, and V. At the same time, it can also pull them into house purposes and make them deteriorate.
6. Layer 3: Insight
A house network can become both a foundation supporting the state and a route for privatizing the state because a house is a semi-institutional unit connected to the core of the state OS through bloodline, marriage, obligation, property, succession, and personnel appointment.
In an ancient state, the state does not operate only through abstract institutions. To operate the state, human resources, military force, property, support bases, information routes, legitimacy, and succession candidates are necessary. Royal houses, clans, and noble houses are important units that supply these resources.
In this sense, a house network supports the state.
Through houses, the king and the state OS obtain human resources.
They obtain troops.
They obtain property.
They obtain alliances through marriage.
They obtain succession candidates.
They reinforce the legitimacy of kingship.
They connect new members to the community.
When bureaucracy and institutional division are still immature, a house network is an important infrastructure of the state OS.
However, the same structure can also become a route for privatizing the state.
This is because a house network is not connected to the state OS only through public purpose. A house has its own purposes: the honor of the house, property, succession, marriage relations, promotion of relatives, jealousy toward rival houses, old grudges, and transfer of power to descendants.
As long as these purposes are aligned with the purpose of the state OS, the house network supports the state. However, when the purpose of the house begins to override the purpose of the state, the house network becomes a route for privatizing the state.
In OS Organizational Design Theory, the failure condition of an OS decision-maker is that the personal purpose of the decision-maker overrides the OS purpose. A judgment against the OS purpose means that the original purpose function of the OS is replaced by the personal purpose of the decision-maker. This is a major cause of decline in V.
The danger of a house network lies exactly here.
When a house supports the state OS, it supplies people, property, legitimacy, and mobilization power.
When a house privatizes the state OS, it pulls personnel decisions, rewards and punishments, succession, information, and decision criteria into the interest of that house.
In other words, a house network is both a supply route and a privatization route for the state.
In Livy, History of Rome, Book 1, this structure appears clearly in the relationship between the Tarquin royal house and Tullia.
In Chapter 46, even though Servius has overwhelming popular approval, the ambition of Tarquinius to seize kingship does not weaken. He sees that Servius’s distribution of land to the plebs was done against the will of the nobles. He thinks this gives him an opportunity to criticize Servius among the nobles and to increase his influence in the senate. In his house, there is Tullia, his wife, who encourages his ambition.
Here, the house network works in two directions.
On the one hand, by gaining support from nobles and houses, Tarquinius obtains a political base. This is the side where the house network supports the formation of kingship.
On the other hand, the same network weakens the public legitimacy and popular approval of Servius and becomes a route for seizing kingship. This is the side where the house network privatizes the state OS.
In Chapter 47, Tullia presses her husband not to make the murders of husband and wife meaningless. She urges him not only to desire the throne, but to seize it. She brings up the household gods, ancestral guardians, the image of his father, the royal house, the throne, and the name of Tarquinius. She pushes her husband toward the seizure of kingship.
In this scene, the house network uses the language of legitimacy to justify the seizure of kingship. Household gods, ancestors, the royal house, the royal name, and the throne should originally support order and succession. However, when they are connected to private ambition, they become a logic that distorts the V of the state OS.
The question is no longer, “Is this right for the state?”
The decision criterion becomes, “Is this natural for the house of Tarquinius?”
At this point, the house network turns from a foundation supporting the state into a route for privatizing the state.
The danger of a house network also comes from the high-coupling nature of Marriage API and Family API.
Family API connects individual OSs through blood relations, marriage, support, succession, responsibility, and emotional bonds. It shares resources, supports succession, and supplies trust. However, when it deviates from moral ethics, it produces restraint, exploitation, domination, excessive responsibility, emotional restraint, loss of freedom, and judgment distortion.
Marriage API forms blood relations, succession, legitimacy, mutual support, and resource sharing. It expands succession candidates, raises the degree of connection, and creates constraints and expectations toward the other OS. At the same time, it can bring in the other OS’s dysfunction, succession problems, interference, succession disputes, interference by relatives, and alliance failure.
This high-coupling nature is both the strength and the weakness of house networks.
Because it is high-coupling, a house network can support the state.
Blood relations create trust.
Marriage stabilizes alliances.
Obligation enables mobilization.
Property enables support.
Succession enables long-term order.
However, because it is high-coupling, a house network can also privatize the state.
Blood relations lead to favoritism toward relatives.
Marriage brings interference by relatives by marriage.
Obligation distorts fair judgment.
Property creates disputes over distribution.
Succession intensifies succession struggles.
In other words, when state institutions are still immature, a house network functions as alternative infrastructure for the state OS. However, if that house network is not connected to public institutions and placed under correction, monitoring, and approval, the house network absorbs the state OS into a private network.
This is why a house network is a dangerous foundation.
If it is external infrastructure, the state OS can easily treat it as an object of management. But a house network enters the inside of the state OS. It is the family of the king, the relatives by marriage of the king, succession candidates, military supporters, property providers, and political patrons.
Therefore, the runaway of a house network is not a simple external risk. It is an internal risk that uses access rights to the core of the state OS.
When a house network supports the state, the house serves the state purpose.
When a house network privatizes the state, the state becomes subordinate to the house purpose.
This difference is critical.
If the state purpose is superior and the house network supports it, the house is a foundation of the state.
If the house purpose is superior and the state OS follows it, the house is a route for privatizing the state.
Therefore, what matters in an ancient state is not to deny house networks. What matters is to connect house networks to the public purpose of the state OS and control them so that they support A, IA, H, and V.
House networks are necessary for state formation.
But if they cannot be institutionalized, visualized, corrected, and monitored, the state is swallowed by the struggles of houses.
A house network supplies human resources.
But without correction, it becomes nepotistic personnel selection.
A house network supplies property.
But without correction, it becomes privatization of property distribution.
A house network supplies legitimacy.
But without correction, it becomes the seizure of power under the pretext of bloodline and honor.
A house network stabilizes succession.
But without correction, it intensifies succession struggles.
Therefore, a house network can become both a foundation supporting the state and a route for privatizing the state.
7. Implications for the Present
This structure also applies to modern organizations.
In modern companies, founding families, family businesses, relatives serving as executives, old factions, school ties, supplier networks, and capital relationships can function in a way similar to house networks in an ancient state.
These networks can support an organization. A founding family may provide a long-term perspective. Veteran employees may hold tacit knowledge. Supplier networks may create a stable business base. Capital relationships may supply necessary resources to the organization.
However, the same networks can also become routes for privatizing the organization.
The interest of a founding family overrides the company purpose.
Appointment of relatives distorts talent evaluation.
Old factions block information routes.
School ties or supplier relationships become criteria for appointment.
Capital relationships are prioritized over field rationality.
Succession is decided by bloodline, personal connection, or faction, not by capability.
At that point, A, IA, H, and V of the organizational OS decline.
A begins to see reality through factional interests rather than actual reality.
IA allows only convenient information to pass.
H turns personnel decisions, rewards, and promotion into nepotism.
V is replaced by the purposes of houses, factions, relatives, or capital relationships instead of the company purpose.
Therefore, even in modern organizations, what matters is not to deny high-coupling networks equivalent to house networks. What matters is whether those networks can be subordinated to the organizational purpose and institutionalized, visualized, corrected, and monitored.
A high-coupling network can become a foundation that supports the organization.
But without correction, it becomes a route for privatizing the organization.
8. Conclusion
A house network can become both a foundation supporting the state and a route for privatizing the state because a house is a semi-institutional unit connected to the core of the state OS through bloodline, marriage, obligation, property, succession, and personnel appointment.
A house network supplies human resources, property, legitimacy, and mobilization power to the state. In this sense, a house network is a foundation for state formation.
However, a house network does not operate only through the state purpose. A house has its own purposes: honor, property, succession, marriage relations, promotion of relatives, jealousy toward rival houses, old grudges, and transfer of power to descendants.
If these house purposes support the state purpose, the house network becomes a foundation of the state.
If these house purposes override the state purpose, the house network becomes a route for privatizing the state.
Therefore, the important point is not to deny house networks. The important point is to connect house networks to the public purpose of the state OS and to institutionalize, visualize, correct, and monitor them so that they support A, IA, H, and V.
For this reason, a house network can become both a foundation supporting the state and a route for privatizing the state.
9. Sources
Titus Livius, History of Rome, Book 1, translated by Satoshi Iwaya, Kyoto University Press, 2008.
OS Organizational Design Theory_R1.30.19.02